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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD H.kCKING and JESSE 
R. S. BUDGE, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Comm~ssion of Utah, 
and PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN 
EXPRESS CO., and CLARK TANK 
LINES COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 9886 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an investigation by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah to determine why the rate published by 
Uintah Freightways for the transportation of crude oil 
in bulk between specific points within the Uintah Basin, 
Utah, should not be permanently suspended. 
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DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMI'8SIO~ 
OF UTAH 
This matter was heard by the Public Service Com 
mission on the 18th day of December, 1962, and on the 5tl 
day of March, 1963, said Commission issued its ordeJ 
directing Uintah Freightways to cease transportation oJ 
petroleum or petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicle~ 
and suspended and cancelled item No. 324-2 of Seconc 
Revised Page 34-A of Tariff 5-G PSCU No. 5 filec 
October 25, 1962. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Uintah Freightways, plaintiff and appellan~ 
hereafter referred to as appellant, seeks reversal of the 
order of the Public Service Commission dated March 5, 
1963, and asks that the Commission be directed to rein-
state and make permanent the tariff heretofore filed and 
above referred to. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 25, 1962, appellant caused to be published 
a tariff naming a rate for the transportation of crude oil 
in bulk between points in the Uintah Basin, Utah, which 
tariff became effective on the 30th day of November, 
1962. Thereafter the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
hereafter referred to as Commission, issued its Investi-
gation Docket No. 95 requiring appellant to appear and 
shorw cause, if any there may be, why the tariff above 
mentioned should not be permanently suspended and why 
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3. 
the Commission should not take such other and further 
action as allowed by law. 
The appellant, Uintah Freightways, holds authority 
from the Commission to operate .as a common carrier of 
property, handling both freight and express, in intrastate 
commerce. Appellant's authority is in three parts and 
reads as follows: 
"ORD,ER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, That Uintah Freightways, be, and 
it is hereby issued Certificate· of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 1288 authorizing it to operate 
as a common carrier of property handling both 
freight and express in intrastate commerce, as 
follows: 
A. 1. Between Salt Lake City, Utah and all points 
within the Uintah Basin2 over U. S. Highway 91 
from Salt Lake City to Provo, thence ove·r U. 8. 
Highway 189 to Heher City and thence over 
U. S. Highway No. 40 and various Utah State 
and County Highways to all points within the 
Uintah Basin with permission to use the Orem 
Cut-off designated as Highway U-52 as alternate 
route, serving, to, from and between all Uintah 
Basin points. 
2. Between Salt Lake City, Utah, and all points 
within the Uintah Basin over U.S. Highway No. 
40 and other various Utah State and County 
Highways to all points within the Uintah Basin 
serving to, from and between all Uintah Basin 
points. 
3. No local service between Salt L~ake City, 
Utah, and Provo, Utah, including Provo, between 
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Salt Lake City and Park City including Park 
City or between Salt Lake City and Heber City 
including Heber City is authorized except ser-
vice is authorized between Salt Lake City and 
Heber City including both termini on both 
routes, on the one hand, and all points in the 
Uintah Basin, on the other, and service is autho-
rized to the intermediate and off route points of 
Vivian Park, Wildwood, Charleston, Daniels, 
Center Creek, Keetley, Midway and Hot Pots. 
B. Between Vernal, Utah, and Price, Utah, via Du-
chesne County, Utah serving Vernal, Utah and 
Price, Utah and all intermediate points. 
C. Between all points in Utah authorized in A and B 
above, on the one hand, and all points in Daggett 
County, Utah, on the other, over irregular 
routes, on call, except service to and from 
Daggett County points is specifically restricted 
against the movement of household goods as 
usually defined, explosives, petroleum and petro-
leum products in bulk, and commodities which 
be reason of their sizes, shape, weight, origin 
or destination require special handling and 
special equipment. 
2. The Uintah Basin as used here is the area encompassed 
in Duchesne and Uintah Counties and that portion of Wasatch 
County in the natural drainage area of the Green River." 
By its authority, Uintah Freightways, under parts A and 
B, is authorized to transport all kinds of property be-
tween points therein designated which includes points in 
Redwash Oil Field, Utah, and covered by the tariff in 
question (R. 110, 153). Under Part C of its authority ap-
pellant is restricted in Daggett County against the move-
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ment of household goods, as usually defined, explosives, 
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk and commodi-
ties which, by reason of their size, shape, weight, orgin 
or destination, require special handling and special 
equipment (R. 111). 
In concluding that appellant has no authority under 
its certificate to transport petroleum or petroleum pro-
ducts in bulk in tank vehicles, the Commission holds 
that parts A and B of appellant's certificate, which con-
tained no exceptions, and part e, which contains excep-
tions, grants identical operating rights (R. 200). 
In summary, the undisputed evidence discloses that 
appellant's authority dates back to October 1926 when it 
was first issued to the Sterling Transportation Company 
(R. 89). From time to time said authority has been en-
larged and transferred and was ultimately purchased by 
appellant from the Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. on Sep-
tember 22, 1958 (R. 111). When appellant was issued its 
certificate of convenience and necessity on September 22, 
1958, respondents, Pacific Intermountain Express Com-
pany and Clark Tank Lines Company, petroleum haulers, 
did not appear in protest notwithstanding the fact that 
the Commission by express direction included their 
names as those entitled to notice of the hearing, which 
presumably they received (R. 79-81, 106, 111). 
Appellant's predecessors in interest, Sterling Tran .. 
sportation ,C'ompany and Uintah Freightlines, handled 
the transportation of liquid petroleum products in bulk, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
as disclosed by their annual reports (Ex. 2). Since ob-
taining its authority, appellant has actively solicited any 
and all traffic available and has discussed with Mr. 
Kenneth H. Sowards, commissioned agent for the 
Continental Oil Company, and with representatives of the 
Standard Oil Company and other companies the trans-
portation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk 
(R. 37-40, 41, 57-58). Upon receiving its first request for 
the transportation of petroleum products in bulk, appel-
lant made application to publish a rate in Intermountain 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., Tariff No. ~G, said rate to be by 
special publication and on one day notice. The special 
pe1rmission was denied and appellant then published the 
rate on statutory notice (R. 56-57). 
Appellant has actively protested any and all applica-
tions for certificates of convenience and necessity involv-
ing the area wherein it does business and to appellant's 
knowledge there have not been any applications filed 
since the year 1958 for certificates of convenience and 
necessity to transport petroleum products in bulk (R. 57). 
Respondents, Clarl{ and Pacific, have both appeared at 
hearings in protest of the granting of applications for 
the transportation of general commodities and at said 
hearings have attempted to elicit from the general com-
modity carrier an exception to the transportation of 
petroleum products in bulk (R~ 67-70). 
There is no finding of uncertainty or ambiguity in 
appellant's certificate, as disclosed by the Commission's 
report and order (R. 196-200). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN APPELLANT'S CER-
TIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, AND 
SAID CERTIFIC.A:TE IS NOT SUBJECT TO INTERPRE-
TATION OR CLARIFICATION. 
The purported finding of fact No. 2 of the Com-
mission states in part as follows: 
"The sole question for determination is the 
interpretation to be given to said certificate No. 
1288." (R. 196) 
It is only where a certificate of convenience and 
necessity is ambiguous or uncertain that it is subject to 
interpretation or clarification by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah. Peterson v. Public Service Commission 
of Utah et al. (1954), 1 Utah 2d 324, 266 P.2d 497. The 
Peterson case involved a proceeding to review an order 
of the Commission permanently suspending tariffs filed 
by Wally Motor Lines, and referred to in the Court's 
opinion as Peterson, for the transportation of commodi-
ties between Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah, via Heber 
City. The right to render the service involved hinged 
upon the language of the certificate. At the hearing no 
question was raised that the rates proposed were exces-
sive, discriminatory or in any way unfair or improper. 
The hearing resolved itself around the interpretation of 
the Peterson certificate. In ;reversing the Commission's 
order permanently suspending the tariffs filed by 
Peterson, the Supreme Court states : 
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"Unless there is some uncertainty or ambigu 
ity there is no basis for interpretation or clarifica. 
tion of the certificate. If it were pennissible t<: 
g.o back of the language and contradict its plarn 
tenns, intolerable confusion and uncertainty 
would exist with regard to operating rights." 
The case of Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Barton 
Truck Lines, Inc. (1959), 8 utah 2d 401, 335 P.2d 829, in-
volved proceedings to review the construction that the 
Public Service Commission had placed upon certificates 
of convenience and necessity authorizing Salt Lake 
Transfer Company to operate as a common motor carrier. 
The correctness of the rule set forth in Peterson v. PUblic 
Service Comm.ission, supra, was reiterated by the Su-
preme Court as follows: 
"We do not gainsay the correctness of the 
rule set forth in Peterson v. Public Service Com-
mission, relied upon by plaintiffs ; that the extent 
of the carrier's authority is to be found from the 
terms of the certificate. We there said that it is 
not permissible, 'to go baclr of the language and 
contradict its plain tenns* * * .' " 
In the case of W. S. Hatch Company v. Public Ser-
vice Commission (1954), 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809, in-
volving a petition by Hatch for authority to haul acid 
used in uranium mining, the Commission denied in part 
Hatch's application and permitted a protest by another 
carder upon the ground that its -authority includes the 
right to transport acid in bulk in tank cars. The speeific 
issue before the Supreme Court was whether or not the 
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protestant Prichard's authority included the right to 
haul acid. In the Hatch case the Court states: 
"The interpretation of the Certificate pre-
sents a question of law only. The extent of 
Prichard's authority must be as found within the 
four corners of the Certificate and the rights 
thereunder must be such a;s are fairly understood 
from the import of its language. Unless there is 
some uncertainty or ambiguity in the Certificate 
there is no basis for interpretation or clarifica-
tion. Operating rights may not be extended by 
interpretation, and Prichard's authority could 
not be augmented in this proceeding wherein he 
appeared only as a protestant." 
The Commission, in arriving at its order, relies upon 
the case of Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Utah (19·62), 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590. In 
this case Milne, in contemplation of transporting pet-
roleum and petroleum products in bul:k in tank vehicles, 
caused to be published a tariff. An investigation and 
suspension hearing was ordered by the Commission to 
determine Milne's authority to handle the transportation 
of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk. 
'Milne presented no evidence at the hearing and re-
lied entirely upon the interpretation of its certificate. 
The Milne case is distinguished from the instant matter 
in the following particulars : 
(a) Milne's authority is for the transportation of 
"commodities generally," and in addition gives Milne 
authority to handle the transportation of such items as 
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explosives, airplane parts etc. Appellant's authority is 
for the transportation of "property" with certain excep-
tions under part C of its authority. 
(b) In the Milne case the Supreme Court noted that 
Milne had always reported under the category of general 
freight but never under liquid petroleum products. Ap-
pellant's predecessors in interest reported in its annual 
report under both general freight and petroleum pro-
ducts (Ex. 2). 
(c) In the Milne case evidence was offered by the 
protesting carriers to show that Milne was never issued 
authority for the transportation of petroleum products 
in bulk, nor did Milne hold itself out to perform this 
service. Milne presented no evidence to the contrary. 
Appellant has actively solicited the transportation of 
petroleum products in bulk, and immediately upon re-
ceiving its first request for the transportation of said 
products made application to publish a rate and made 
arrangements to procure the necessary equip1nent (Ex. 4, 
R. 55-56). No evidence was offered to the contrary by 
the Commission or protesting carriers Clark and Pacific. 
(d) In the Milne case there was no evidence offered 
that Milne or any other general commodity carrier had 
ever protested the granting of authority to transport 
petroleum products in bulk. The evidence discloses in the 
instant matte~r that the authorities of Pacific and Clark 
were both granted prior to the issuance to appellant of its 
authority, and that appellant has actively protested any 
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and all applications for certificates of convenience and 
necessity within the area served by appellant. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. 
(e) In the Milne case no evidence was offered con-
cering the prote·st of carriers specializing in the trans-
portation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk. 
The evidence in the instant matter discloses that the Com-
mission, by express direction, required notice to he sent to 
respondents Pacific and Clark of the hearing resulting in 
the granting to appellant of its authority, and discloses 
that both Pacific and Clark have appeared in protest to 
the granting of applications for the transportation of 
general commodities and at said hearings have attempted 
to elicit from the general commodities carriers an excep-
tion to the transportation of petroleum products in bulk. 
The Commission erroneously interprets the decision 
in the Milne case, supra, claiming that said case holds 
that the word "property" in appellant's certificate does 
not, under the facts and circumstances in the instance 
matter, include all articles of commerce. This is not the 
holding of the Milne case. In that case the term "com-
modities generally" was subject to interpretation and the 
Supreme Court states : 
"The meaning of the term 'commodities gen-
erally' must be ascertained from the particular 
facts of eacn case." 
In addition the Commission in its order quotes in finding 
number 7 the language cited by appellant in its reply brief 
and ta:ken from the Milne case as follows : 
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12 
''under Milne's all inclusive interpretation of 
·commodities generally' the further designation of 
commodities would be unnecessary." 
and then interprets contrary to the law set forth above. 
Appellant agrees with the Court's reasoning in the 
Milne case, supra, that where certificates of convenience 
and necessity authorize the transportation of com-
modities generally, and in addition authorize the trans-
portation of such items as explosives, airplane parts, 
supplies, equipment etc, that the further designation of 
commodities would be unnecessary if the term "commodi-
ties generally' includes all property capable of transpor-
tation. By the same token, where a certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity authorizes the transportation of pro-
perty without exception in certain areas, and then ex-
pressly excludes the transportation of certain commodi-
ties in other areas including liquid petroleum products 
in bulk, the exclusion would be wholly unnecessary if the 
word "property" did not include those items expressly 
excluded. Part C of appellant's authority reads as 
follows: 
"Between all points in Utah authorized in A 
and B above, on the one hand, and all points in 
Daggett County, Utah, on the other, over irregu-
lar routes, on call, except service to and from 
D'aggett County points is specifically restricted 
against the movement of household goods as usu-
ally defined, explosives, petroleum and petroleum 
products in bulk, and commodities which be reason 
of their size, shape, weight, orgin or destination 
require special handling and special equipment." 
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It is apparent that appellant is only restricted against 
the movement of petroleum and petroleum products in 
bulk where said products orginate at or are destined to 
Daggett County, Utah. 
The case of Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. et al v. Charlton 
Bros. Triansportation Company; Inc. (1948), 48 MCC 289, 
is an action by a specialized petroleum products carrier 
challenging the right of Charlton Bros. Transportation 
Company, Inc. to handle the transportation of petroleum 
products in bulk in tank vehicles under its general com-
modities authority. 
The certificate of Charlton Bros. Transportation 
Company, Inc. authorizes it to engage in transportation 
in interstate and foreign commerce as a common carrier 
by motor vehicle over regular and irregular routes be-
tween certain points or territories in Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, and West Virginia. The certificate con-
tains three descriptions, e~ach relating t'O different points 
or territories of the kinds of commodities Charlton may 
transport. In part one the carrier is authorized to handle 
the transportation of general commodities except live-
stock, dange1rous explosives, household goods, coal, sand 
and lime. In part two the carrier is authorized to handle 
the transportation of general commodities except explo-
sives and commodities of unusual value and household 
goods. In part three the carrier is authorized to handle 
the transportation of general commodities except live-
stock, explosives, household goods and loose bulk goods 
requiring special equipment. It was conceded .at the time 
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14 
of the hearing that the carrier could not handle the trans-
portation of petroleum products in bulk, in tank vehicles 
under part three of its authority. The question before 
the Commission was whether in descriptions one ood two 
the term "gener.al commodities" inclw.des petroleum 
products in bulk, in tank trucks. The complainants and 
integrators specialize in the transportation of petroleum 
products and contended that the term "general commodi-
ties" does not include petroleum products in tanks and 
that the transportation thereof by Charlton is being per-
formed without authority. The Commission states: 
"We believe the weight of authority supports 
the conclusion that the term 'general' commodi-
ties' in certificates of public convenience and 
necessity means all types of commodities, except 
to the extent restricted. To hold, for example, 
that two certificates, one containing authority to 
transport general commodities without excep-
tions, and another, authority to transport general 
commodities, except petroleum products, in bulk, 
in tank trucks, grant identical operating rights, 
is to do violence to the plain meaning of the teTIIlB 
of the certificate. Interpretations of certificates 
based on classifications of motor carriers, or on 
the basis of matters antecendent to the issuance of 
a certificate, the terms of which are not patently 
ambiguous, can only lead to instability in the 
motor carrier industry and uncertainty among 
their patrons as to the operating rights of motor 
carriers. 
While it may be that when the certificate was 
originally issued to the defendant, petroleum 
products, in bulk, in tank trucks, should have 
been excepted from the grant of authority, they 
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15 
were not, and we may not now by interpretation, 
so modify the certificate." 
Appellant's certificate is clear, definite and· certain 
and the attempt on the part of the Commission to inter:-
pret said certificate contrary to its terms is arbitrary, 
capricious and is not supported by the evidence and is 
contrary to the law. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION 
ARE NOT ,SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPE'TENT EVIDENCE 
AND THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS. 
Where the Commission acts in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner its order is without authority and 
must be set aside. Orders issued in the complete .absence 
of factual support are clearly arbitrary, capricious and 
void. Salt Lake Tr.ansfer Compamy v. Public Service 
Commission of Ut,ah (1960), 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P2d 706. 
The Commission in its finding number 2 recognizes that 
one of appellant's predecessors in interest, Sterling 
Transportation Company, transported crude oil and gas-
oline in bulk and crude oil and gasoline from 1940 to 
1946. It then concludes that having failed to transport 
the products .after 1946 it should be deemed to have 
abandoned any claim for such transportation if it ever 
possessed an authority to do so. Such a finding is not 
a statement of fact but a mere conclusion, wholly un-
supported by the evidence and contrary to the law. By 
Investigation Docket No. 95 appellant was not called 
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upon to show cause why its authority to handle the 
transportation of petroleum products in bulk should not 
be treated as having been .abandoned and thus cancelled. 
Abandonment as applied to property is the voluntary 
relinquishment of the possession of a thing by the owner 
with the intention of terminating his ownership. Ballen-
t.ine Law Dictionary 1930; Sven J. Johanson et al., djbja 
Johanson Oarbic Oilfield Trucking & Moving, Applica-
tion No. 16645, Permit No. B-3566, Public Utilities Re-
ports, Volume 3, Pur. 3d 1960, page 520. 
The mere fact of an interruption in operations does 
not automatically revoke .a certificate. Quaker City Bus 
Line-Pur-Blackhawk Line, MC-F 1546, 38 MOC 603. A 
continual holding out as willing to perform the service 
is contrary and inconsistent with abandonment. Charlr-
ton Bros. Tnansportation Co., Inc.-P11!l'-Rogers, MC-F-
1864, 39 MCC 610; Beef River Valley Telephone Co., 
2 U -989, Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 54, 
Volume 16, Public Utilities Reports, New Series 1937, 
page 361. 
,The evidence is undisputed that appellant has con-
tinuously since obtaining its authority held itself out as 
ready, able and willing to handle the transportation of 
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles. 
The statement of the Commission in finding number 
2 that appellant never attempted to engage in any trans-
portation of petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles 
prior to the filing of the subject Tariff is contrary to 
the evidence. The undisputed evidence is that appellant 
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has since receiving its authority actively solicited any 
and all traffic available including the transportation of 
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in tank 
vehicles. In addition appellant has made numerous in-
quiries concerning the. availability of equipment should 
it be tendered traffic requiring the use of liquid bulk 
equipment, and upon receiving its first request published 
the tariff in question (R. 55-58, 37-40, 41). Business 
prudence will not dictate a substantial investment in 
equipment, said equipment to remain idle pending a 
request for its use, and in the interest of the public a 
carrier must operate economically. S.o long .as the carrier 
has available to it the necessary equipment when the 
need arises it is in a position to properly service its 
certificate. 
The Commission in finding number 6 states: 
"The Commission must decide each case on 
its own merits. It should not give a word or 
phrase an enlarged meaning which it was never 
intended to have; - a meaning· which the owner 
of the certificate never intended it should have 
and which in many respects its owner would not 
now wish to claim." (Emphasis added) 
There is a complete absence of factual support for the 
above quoted language .and it is contrary to the plain 
language of appellant's certificate and of appellant's 
intentions and claims as evidenced by the record. In 
fact, if appellant never intended or wished to claim its 
certificate permitted the transportation of petroleum and 
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles, this pro-
ceeding would not now be before the Court. 
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The fact that appellant, without protest, pennitted 
other petroleum carriers to secure certificates of conven-
ience and necessity is immaterial. It is possible that 
additional service may be required notwithstanding the 
fact that there is in existence carriers presently author-
ized to render such service. In addition appellant's 
authority was not granted until after the issuance to 
Clark and Pacific to their certificates of convenience 
and necessity. 
The Commission in finding number 4 states : 
"The word 'property', in common parlance, 
has a very broad application, but what might be 
the result if we should give to it the application 
for which Freightways here contends Y If 'proper-
ty', without exclusions includes petroleum in bulk, 
in tank vehicles, then it includes everything trans-
portable and Freightways can transport through-
out all its territory other than to and from 
Daggett County household goods, boilers, stressed 
concrete girders, oil and gas rigs, tractors on flat 
rack trucks, in fact, every conceivable article or 
product known to commerce. Uintah Freightways, 
of course, does not claim such a right at this 
time, but its claim to transport such items would 
be just as valid as to transport petroleum and 
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles." 
The word "property" as used in appellant's certificate 
means "that which is palpable or tangible and is material 
and physical in its nature." 42 Am. Jur., Property, Sec--
tion 11, page 194. Petroleum and petroleum products in 
bulk are capable of being touched or felt and are tangible, 
material and physical in nature. 
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Where the Commission interprets the English lang-
uage contrary to the well-established definitions, thus 
nullifying rights bargained and paid for by appellant, 
the action on its part is arbitflary and carpicious. In 
addition such action can only lead to instability in the 
motor carrier industry and create uncertainty in the 
minds of the shipping public concerning the products 
carriers can handle. Through specialization we cannot, 
by mere misuse of the English language, eliminate the 
general commodity carrier anymore than we would seek 
to eliminate the general physician or general practitioner. 
To say that appellant does not claim the right to 
handle the transportation of household goods, boilers, 
stressed concrete girders, oil and gas rigs, tractors on 
flat rack trucks and every other conceivable article or 
product known to commerce through all its territory, 
other than to and from Daggett County, is a conelusion 
of the Commission unsupported by any evidence and is 
clearly arbitrary and capricious. Appellant has since 
first receiving its authority and does now hold itself out 
as ready, able and willing to handle the transportation 
of the items referred to above, and in fact engages in 
such transportation. 
In general the purported findings of the Commis-
sion are mere conclusions of either law or fact and are 
without any factual support and are clearly arbitrary, 
capricious and void. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
POINT III. 
THE PERMANENT SUSPENSION OF ITEM 324-2 OF 
SE1COND REVISED PAGE 34-8 OF TARIFF 5-G PSCU NO. 
5 IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL. 
Under Section 54-6-4, Utah Code .Arvnotated 1953, 
the Commission cannot arbitrarily refuse to approve a 
tariff, thus nullifying appellant's right under its cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity. In this connection 
we call the Court's attention to the case of Peterson v. 
Public Service Commission of Ut.ah, supra, which states: 
"It is the prerogative of this Court to deter-
mine whether the Commission regularly pursued 
its authority. Under Sec. 54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953 
vesting in the Commission power to regulate 
motor carriers we do not find any authority 
either directly, or reasonably incident thereto, by 
which the Commission could arbitrarily refuse to 
approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the rights a 
carrier possesses under a Certificate of ·Conven-
ience and Necessity." 
POINT IV. 
'THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
O'F'FER OF PROOF CONCERNING AUTHORITIES OF CER-
TAIN CARRIERS. 
Appellant offered in evidence the authorities of 
Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Lyman Truck Line, Linak 
Trucking, Inc., Uintah Truck Express Company, L. R. 
Reid & Sons Truck Line and Park City Truck Lines 
(R. 52-53). The purpose of this offer was to prove that 
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the Commission has heretofore issued authorities, gen-
eral in their terms, with explicit exclusions as to certain 
commodities including in some instances petroleum prod-
ucts in bulk. 
As stated 1n Point I, where a certificate of con-
venience and necessity authorizes the transportation of 
property without exception in certain areas and then 
expressly excludes the transportation of certain com-
modities in other areas, the exclusion would be wholly 
unnecessary if the word "property" did not include those 
items expressly eoccluded. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub-
lice Service Commission of Utah, supra; Coastal Took 
Lines, Inc. et al. v. Charlton Bros. Transportation Com-
pany, Inc., supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's authority authorizes it to transport 
property without exception in part A and B and has 
an express limitation in p:art C. If the term "property" 
did not include the transportation of petroleum and 
petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles, the express 
limitation in part C would be wholly unnecessary. Ap-
pellant's predecessors in interest handled the transporta-
tion of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk. 
Appellant has since it acquired its authority considered 
itself ready, able and willing to handle the transportation 
of petroleum products in bulk and has continuously since 
its inception solicited said business. 
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The interpretation placed on appellant's authority 
by the Commission is contrary to the plain, certain and 
unambiguous terms of the certificate, has no factual 
support and is clearly arbitrary, capricious and void. 
We respectfully submit that appellant has authority to 
transport petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in 
the area covered by Item 324-2 of Second Revised Page 
34-A of Tariff 5-G PSCU No. 5, and that the order of the 
Conunission should be reversed and said Commission 
should be ordered to reinstate and make permanent said 
Tariff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM S. RlCHARDS 
GUS:TIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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